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Seismic Design Basis- The UK Regulatory Position for New 
Nuclear Reactors 
C. M. Patchett and R. J. Stubbs 
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, St. Peter's House, Balllol Road, 
BOOTLE, Merseyslde, United Kingdom 
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to outline the seismic regulatory requirements relating to the site 
licensing of new nuclear power installations in the UK, and to describe the background and justification of the 
seismic design basis level for such installations. It outlines the potential seismic related hazards which should 
be covered, the factors which are considered important in establishing the level of hazard under consideration, and 
the techniques which could be used for hazard evaluation. In addition, the paper covers the level of uncertainty 
associated with the methodology and analytical techniques used in evaluating the seismic hazards. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade HM Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII) have been involved in the assess-
ment of safety submissions for the Sizewell B PWR 
which is currently under construction, and for the 
proposed Hinkley Point C PWR. In both cases the 
Inspectorate has submitted evidence to, and been cross 
examined on, the assessment of the licensees safety 
cases, at Public Inquiries (Refs 1 & 2). 
This paper outlines the g~neral approach taken by the 
Inspectorate in the assessment of external hazards for 
those two sites, and then describes in detail the 
extent of information required from the licensees to 
satisfy the Inspectorate on the major factors which 
determine the seismic hazard. It is not intended that 
this paper be used as a check list, it reflects the 
Inspectorate's experience in this topic for the two 
most recently proposed nuclear power plants. It also 
discusses the Inspectorate's approach to the uncertain-
ties which are inevitably present in seismic hazard 
determination. 
Although not a consideration of this paper, the latest 
Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) built in the UK are 
also designed against the seismic hazard, as are the 
more recent nuclear chemical plant. However these 
installations being designed whilst UK seismic 
standards were being developed have slightly different 
design basis criteria. There is nevertheless an 
equivalence to the UK PWR's. The older Magnox reactors 
and nuclear chemical plant whilst not designed with 
the seismic hazard in mind, clearly have an inherent 
seismic capability. This is being assessed, and 
strengthened where appropriate, under the Long Term 
Safety Review, and Fully Developed Safety Case for 
reactors and chemical plant respectively. 
2. LEGISLATIVE BASIS 
In the United Kingdom no site may be used for the 
purpose of installing or operating any commercial 
nuclear installation unless a nuclear site licence has 
been granted to a corporate body by the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). The Inspectorate is that part 
of the HSE which is responsible for administering this 
licensing function. Specific Acts of Parliament and 
supporting legislation provide general requirements for 
the safety of nuclear installations, but specific 
requirements are covered by licence conditions which are 
binding by law. 
Under these Acts, absolute responsibility for nuclear 
safety rests with the licensee. The duty of the 
Inspectorate is to ensure that appropriate standards are 
developed, achieved and maintained by the licensee, to 
ensure necessary safety precautions are taken and to 
regulate and monitor the plant by means of its powers 
under the stte licence. The Inspectorate independ,~tly 
reviews and assesses the licensees to ensure compliance 
with the requirements at all stages throughout the plant 
life. The Inspectorate does not operate a prescriptive 
regime, which means that licensees are free to develop 
their own safety standards and plant safety cases using 
appropriate methodologies. 
3. Nil SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES 
In order that a consistent approach is adopted towards 
safety assessment the Inspectorate has developed Safety 
Assessment Principles, for nuclear power reactors (Ref 
3) and nuclear chemical plant (Ref 4), which are primar-
ily for the use of its own staff, but also with a view 
to assisting designers and operators. These assessment 
principles form a statement of the safety assessment 
related to new plant. They contain fundamental require-
ments and basic principles supported by a set of engine-
ering principles. The two referenced documents are 
currently under revision. 
The safety submission from a licensee for a new installa-
tion should show that the design meets their safety 
standards, the Inspectorate assesses the submission to 
ensure compliance with it's Safety Assessment Principles. 
Naturally licensees are encouraged to demonstrate that 
their standards comply with the Inspectorate's Principles. 
For plant faults, ie; faults which would occur in safety 
related plant or equipment the Inspectorate has adopted 
the following numerical criteria. 
(1) For any single accident which could give rise to a 
large uncontrolled release of radioactivity, (more than 
a few ERL, which for the whole body is currently a dose 
equivalent of 500mSv) to the environment resulting 
from some or all of the protection systems and barriers 
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being breached or failed, then the over a 11 design 
should ensure that the accident frequency is less than 
1E-7 per year. 
(2) The total frequency of all accidents leading to 
uncontrolled releases should be less than 1E-6 per 
year. 
Adoption of these criteria mean that a plant which 
meets them falls within maximum tolerable risk levels 
for individual members of the public and society as 
proposed in the HSE published discussion document on 
the Tolerability of Risk (Ref 5). 
In case of the seismic hazard, the determination of an 
event for plant design having a nominal return period 
of about once in 1QOOO years is not considered un-
reasonable for the UK. This event is more commonly 
known as the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for nuclear 
power plant. For nuclear chemical plant it is gen-
erally referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). 
Consequent upon such a design basis event and the 
criteria given in section 3(1) above, it is necessary 
that the protection system or barrier required to pro-
tect against the event has a reliability of the order 
of 1E-3 per year. Independently of this the 
Inspectorareconsiders that a well engineered safety 
system has a probability of failure between 1E-5 and 
1E-3 per demand (Ref 3). It is therefore concluded 
that a plant appropriately designed and qualified 
against the SSE/DBE meets the Inspectorate's criteria 
for a single accident that could give rise to a large 
uncontrolled release of radioactivity. 
The Inspectorate's Safety Assessment Principles are 
concerned generally with targets which should be met 
when establishing the seismic hazHrd at a site. More 
detailed guidance on establishing the seismic hazard 
for a potential nuclear site is given by the IAEA in 
their code of practice, (Ref 6), and Safety Guide, (Ref 
7). The Inspectorate considers these documents to 
outline the minimum standards which have to beach-
ieved. 
4. SEISMIC HAZARDS 
The Inspectorate expects a licensee to identify in the 
safety case for a potential site all those hazards 
associated with earthquake activity which could affect 
plant safety. For example; earthquake ground motion, 
ground rupture, liquefaction, ground subsidence, 
landslips, earthquake generated tsunamis and seiches 
generated by long period ground motions. In the case 
of Sizewell B, the first and third examples were of 
particular concern. 
Initially the licensee should review all these po-
tential hazards to determine whether any one is large 
enough to prevent use of the site. 
Having demonstrated the site is viable each of the 
hazards should be assessed by the licensee and compared 
against the safety criteria. Depending on the location 
some of the hazards can be readily discounted, but 
others may require more rigorous assessment to as-
certain the design basis level. The hazards which 
have been the subject of detailed safety cases by 
licensees in the UK in recent years are seismic ground 
motion·, 1 iquefaction and ground rupture. The 
·Inspectorate's approach to the assessment of ground 
motion and ground rupture is covered in the following 
sections. 
5. DETERMINATION OF SEISMIC HAZARD 
Determination of the seismic hazard can be established 
in several ways, for instance; a deterministic route 
establishing the maximum potential earthquake, a 
probabilistic route with deterministic input para-
meters, or a full probabilistic route. In the UK 
licensees have generally favoured the probabilistic 
route with deterministic input parameters. 
Determination of this hazard requires input from 
various sources. These can generally be defined as the 
geology of the potential site and surrounding region, 
and seismological information such as historical 
earthquake and instrumental data. Using this infor-
mation it should be possible to build a model of the 
regional earthquake environment around the site. 
Figure 1 describes the process leading to the deter-
mination of the seismic hazard. Each of the topics is 
discussed separately below. 
5.1 GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION 
In determining the geology the objective is to under-
stand the tectonics and consequently the seismo-
tectonics of the region. One aspect is to attempt to 
obtain geological evidence to allow assumptions to be 
made about the size of the region where the seismo-
tectonics can be considered to be similar. The other 
aspect is to determine whether any significantly active 
faulting occurs on or close to the site, which may have 
to be modelled as an independent source of seismic 
events in the hazard analysis. 
The extent of the regional study will depend upon both 
the seismology and geology to ensure that all relevant 
data is obtained. Such data may be available from 
published sources and will require the assistance of 
specialists who have worked in the area of concern. 
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Close to the site the objective should be to establish 
the potential for permanent ground displacement. It is 
expected that detailed geological mapping would be 
carried out in the area to understand the site geology. 
In addition geophysical and geotechnical studies 
should be carried out supported by laboratory testing 
where appropriate. This could include the drilling of 
boreholes and trial pits. 
In all these studies the Inspectorate considers that 
information from deep reflection surveys can be of 
valuable assistance in establishing the extent of 
faulting at depth. In addition the crustal stress of 
a region will assist in the understanding of the 
current tectonics. Satellite imagery can also provide 
valuable information on surface features which are not 
readily visible from the ground. 
5.2 HISTORICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL SEISMICITY 
It is clearly very important to understand the histo-
rical seismicity of the region and to identify any 
possible trends. It is considered that all relevant 
historical seismicity should be determined back to the 
earliest possible time. The UK is extremely fortunate 
in having primary records from ecclesiastical and 
other sources dating back to before 1000 AD. The 
information should be used to determine parameters 
such as intensity, epicenter, focal depth, or any 
spatial or temporal trends. The techniques used in 
establishing such information should be well founded, 
(Ref 8). 
More recently instrumental data has become available, 
and it is necessary that all relevant measurements for 
the region should be collated and estimates of, for 
instance; magnitude, focal depth, and epicenter be 
determined. Such information should be reviewed to 
ensure that it is due to earthquake ground motion 
rather than man induced events, such as mining activ-
ities or quarry blasting. From the interpretation of 
instrumental and macroseismic data it is possible to 
assign magnitudes to historical events. 
6.0 METHODS FOR ESTIMATION OF THE SEISMIC DESIGN 
BASIS GROUND MOTION 
In order to determine the ground motion hazard, the 
information derived from the geological and historical 
databases established from information in sections 5 
should be merged to establish a seismotectonic model 
of the region. In general in the UK, it is considered 
that such a model will comprise areas of diffuse 
seismicity which originate from earthquakes not attrib-
utable to specific structures, and areas attributed to 
known seismic sources. It is necessary that all that 
is reasonably practicable should be done to establish 
a model that takes into account the most recent geo-
logical understanding of the region under consideration. 
The design basis ground motions can be characterized 
by time histories and response spectra for a suite of 
damping values. If sufficient data is available then 
it would be appropriate to calculate specific site 
response spectra. Otherwise a more generic approach 
is taken as is described later. 
6.1.1 DETERMINISTIC TECHNIQUES 
As stated above the deterministic route would in all 
probability involve establishing the maximum earthquake 
potential for the site. This would be expected to be 
based upon the information established from the studies 
covered in section 5. The maximum earthquake potential 
associated with the structures identified from the 
seismotectonic model would be established using con-
servative assumptions. It is considered that such a 
route may well be appropriate in regions where there 
are well defined structures showing regular seismicity. 
However in areas of low seismicity the maximum poten-
tial earthquake may be difficult to determine due to 
the lack of seismic activity and could lead to the 
assignment of a very conservative value, with little 
scientific support. 
6.1.2 PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUES 
Probabilistic techniques which use data derived by 
deterministic means are considered by the Inspectorate 
to be a suitable method for establishing the earthquake 
hazard in areas of low seismicity. Such methods should 
use the details and parameters which have been estab-
lished from the seismotectonic model. This would 
include modelling potential sources of activity and 
areas of diffuse seismicity which will have been 
derived from the instrumental, historical and geo-
logical databases. 
It is currently considered that a full integrated 
probabilistic analysis is not realistic. However an 
analysis such as that developed by McGuire (Ref 10), 
based on a probabilistic model but with deterministic 
input data is a more appropriate method, and has been 
used by a licensee, (Ref 11). This does not mean that 
other methods would not be acceptable. It is the res-
ponsibility of the licensees to determine suitable 
methodologies which the Inspectorate will assess. 
The results of such models would give a best estimate 
peak free field acceleration hazard curve for varying 
confidence levels. Such calculations are subject to 
uncertainty in the input parameters which should be 
addressed by means of sensitivity studies. It is the 
Inspectorate's opinion that for UK seismicity the most 
important factors are the input parameters associated 
with the geological interpretation ofthe region. Ex-
perience in the assessment of licensee's safety cases 
has shown that this area is the most sensitive in 
determining the seismic hazard level. 
7.0 GROUND RUPTURE 
Ground rupture as a potential hazard was noted in 
section 4. However it is for the licensee to decide 
how his safety case will address the hazard. There are 
a number of possible approaches the licensee could use 
to demonstrate compliance with the Inspectorate's 
Assessment Principles. For example; to show that there 
are no faults under the potential site which would 
cause ground rupture leading to the failure of struc-
tures, and to a large release of radioactivjty. 
Alternatively they could demonstrate that there is a 
less than one in 10 million chance per year of a sig-
nificant fault rupture occuring. Currently licensees 
have attempted to meet the latter option. 
The relationship of faulting at or near the site with 
regional faulting should be determined, to ascertain 
whether there is any correlation with faults known to 
be significant in terms of regional activity. This 
area is subjective and requires the expertise and skill 
of geologists with previous experience of the region. 
Having identified any fault which could be considered 
as potentially active, ie; those relating to major 
fault structures, the time of last activity should be 
determined. This could be achieved from an under-
standing of the regional tectonics if the potential 
activity is small. If there is strong evidence from 
seismicity data suggesting very recent movement {by 
geological timescales), or the structure is close to 
the site, further more detailed investigations may be 
necessary. The Hinkley Point C site was an example of 
this, where detailed investigation of a neighbouring 
fault was necessary, (Ref 12). 
Currently this is an area where there exists a variety 
of techniques which can be used to date fault move-
ment in areas of low seismicity such as the UK. These 
are often used in other areas and their validity and 
degrees of error are knowg,and therefore their use is 
generally accepted. One of the main difficulties is 
identifying the material which should be taken from the 
fault to determine the date of last movement. Con-
sequently the dating process often gives rise to large 
uncertainty. This is not to denigrate the techniques, 
rather it is necessary that the licensee does all that 
is reasonably practicable to establish a realistic 
result. 
8. GENERATION OF RESPONSE SPECTRA AND TIME HISTORIES 
In the UK a generic set of response spectra have been 
developed by the licensees which are considered to be 
representative of UK seismicity. Current practise in 
the UK due to a sparsity of real earthquake time history 
measurements is based upon choosing a number of earth-
quake time histories from other regions. These are 
European and US events that are considered to rep-
resent UK earthquakes. From these records, standard 
response spectra are generated using the USNRC approach (Ref 9). For a given installation the spectra would 
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be normalized to the peak ground acceleration for the 
site. Furthermore the spectra are classified as hard, 
intermediate and sort ground conditions which are re-
lated to depth to a competent rockhead level. Time 
histories can then be derived from the appropriate 
spectra. 
This overall approach has been assessed by the 
Inspectorate and found to be realistically conservative. 
9. UNCERTAINTIES IN THE HAZARD DETERMINATION 
As is apparent from above the determination of the 
seismic hazard is subject to uncertainty, because of 
this the Inspectorate requires that sensitivity 
analyses be carried out on the calculations to establish 
whether any one parameter, if changed, would signif-
icantly affect the results. In addition it is also 
expected that this would include investigations into 
the constraints of the chosen model, such that if a 
different model were chosen the significance of the 
change on the results of the hazard analysis could be 
determined. 
Furthermore, since the hazard is calculated for SSE 
which generally has a mean return period of 10,000 
years the Inspectorate has asked licensees to de-
monstrate the capability of their structures at a 
hazard level beyond this value. This is to demonstrate 
that there is no sudden disproportionate increase in 
the risk for an increase in hazard level beyond the 
SSE. 
Currently the hazard level at which plants are ass-
essed for their performance beyond the SSE is forty per 
cent greater than the SSE. The licensees do not de-
sign their structures to meet this level, but assess 
the capability of the plant to ensure that no con-
dition exists such that there is a disproportionate 
increase in the risk from the plant due to radioactive 
releases. Clearly safety margins will be less than at 
the design basis, and this is accepted. 
10. REPORTING AND RECORDING OF INFORMATION SUPPORTING 
THE SAFETY CASE FOR A PLANT 
In the preparation of a safety case for the seismic 
hazard it is important that the information used is 
properly reported and recorded. Such a process should 
be subject to quality assurance procedures which are 
auditable. 
One of the more important contentious aspects of a 
safety case is where judgements by experts have been 
made, either through a committee or individually. The 
Inspectorate considers that in particular in such cases 
they should be recorded so the assessor is able to 
establish how and why decisions were made. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
It is considered that the determination of the seismic 
hazard is still in an evolutionary stage and subject 
to many uncertainties. Nevertheless the work carried 
out in support of siting nuclear plant in the UK is 
considered to use realistic models based upon the best 
available geological and seismological data. Conse-
quently, it ensures that the design basis levels 
determined are scientifically and technically justi-
fiable and not overly conservative. 
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